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Abstract
In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally
robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models
the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversar-
ial distribution. Thus each player’s payoff depends on the other players’
decisions and on the decision of a virtual player (nature) who selects
an adversarial distribution of scenarios. This paper provides three main
contributions. Firstly, the distributionally robust game is formulated us-
ing the statistical notions of f -divergence between two distributions, here
represented by the adversarial distribution, and the exact distribution.
Secondly, the complexity of the problem is significantly reduced by means
of triality theory. Thirdly, stochastic Bregman learning algorithms are
proposed to speedup the computation of robust equilibria. Finally, the
theoretical findings are illustrated in a convex setting and its limitations
are tested with a non-convex non-concave function.
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1 Introduction
Games with payoff uncertainty refer to games where the outcome of a play is
not known with certainty by the players. Such games are also called incomplete
information games and can be formalized in different ways. Distribution-free
models of incomplete information games, both with and without private infor-
mation are examined in [1, 2]. There the players use a robust optimization
approach to contend with the worst-case scenario payoff. The distribution free
approach relaxes the well-known Bayesian game model approach by Harsanyi.
The limitation of the distribution-free model is that the uncertainty set has to
be carefully designed and in most cases such approach leads to too conservative
and unrealistic scenarios.
Strategic learning has proven to be a powerful approach in stochastic games.
In particular, its algorithmic nature is well suited to accommodate parallel and
distributed information exchange and processing as well as hardware realizabil-
ity. However, almost all existing learning approaches work well only for spe-
cific classes of games such as concave-convex zero-sum games, convex potential
games, and some S-modular game problems with unimodal objective functions.
For more general classes of games, convergence of strategic learning dynamics
is still an open issue. In addition, learning algorithms for finding fixed points or
equilibria for general classes of games still present several challenges. For poly-
matrix games with finite action spaces, there have been great progress includ-
ing Cournot adjustment, Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, reinforcement
learning, combined learning (see [13] and the references therein). For continu-
ous action spaces, however, only few handful works are available. Evolutionary
dynamics and revision protocols based actions has been proposed [6, 9, 5]. The
exploration of continuous action takes too much time if the dynamics is based
on individual action or measurable subsets [3, 7, 8]. Moreover, the convergence
time of these existing strategic learning algorithms (when a convergence to a
point or a limit cycle occurs) are unacceptably high even for potential games
and it often requires strong assumptions such as bounded densities. The above
mentioned prior works do not consider robust games setting. In [1, 2] a robust
game framework is presented. The authors defined a distributed-free approach
(by considering worst-case performance). However the choice of the uncertainty
set remains an important part of the robust game modelling. In this work we
are interested in learning in distributionally robust games under f -divergence.
1.1 Contribution
We make several contributions in this paper. We introduce for the first time a
novel game model, called distributionally robust game. This game provides a
new and original way of addressing game scenarios with incomplete information.
For this game, we provide a rigorous definition of distributionally robust equilib-
rium. Distributionally robust games accommodate both finite and continuous
action spaces. The relevance in formulating such a new game is in that it relaxes
the assumptions of Harsanyi’s Bayesian games. Distributionally robust games
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differ from the distribution-free framework of Aghassi & Bertsimas in [1, 2] in
that in the distribution-free approach the interval (or generally the uncertainty
set) needs to be known (learnable) by the decision-maker. In contrast to this,
in the distributionally robust approach any alternative distribution within a
divergence ball can be tested.
As second contribution, we use a triality theory, which reduces considerably
the curse of dimensionality of the problem. We prove the existence of equilibria
in any such robust finite game under suitable conditions.
As third contribution, we provide a computational method based on Breg-
man flow for approximately computing equilibria. Such a computational method
allows us to test the implementability of the approach on numerical examples.
We introduce a class of distributionally robust games with continuous action
spaces, for which a subset of equilibria can be computed using the Bregman
algorithm. We show that the resulting iterative dynamics, which we call Breg-
man dynamics, is characterized by double exponential decay and convergence
to distributionally robust equilibria.
1.2 Structure
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce dis-
tributionally robust games. Section 3 presents a learning algorithm for robust
equilibria. Section 4 focuses on stochastic Bregman learning. Section 5 pro-
vides numerical results. Discussions on the finite action spaces are presented in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Distributionally Robust Games
In this section, we first introduce the distribution uncertainty set, and then
formulate the distributionally robust game problem. Then, we define distri-
butionally robust equilibrium, discuss triality theory and apply such theory to
reduce the model via Lagrangian relaxation.
2.1 Distribution Uncertainty Set
Let (Ω,F ,m) be a probability space. Here m is a probability measure defined
on (Ω,F). The distribution m of the state ω is used to capture the probability of
the different scenarios and of the corresponding performance function obtained
under each of such scenarios for fixed action profile. We assume that the exact
distribution of the state is not available in general. Therefore we propose an
uncertainty/constraint set among all the possible distributions with a divergence
bounded by above by a scalar value ρ. Such a constraint takes the form
Bρ(m) = {m˜ |
∫
Ω
dm˜ = m˜(Ω) = 1, Df (m˜ || m) ≤ ρ},
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where Df is the so-called f -divergence from the probability measure m to m˜
defined as
Df (m˜ || m) =
∫
ω∈Ω
f
(
dm˜
dm
)
dm− f(1).
Recall that for a convex (and proper) function f the Legendre-Fenchel du-
ality holds: (f∗)∗ = f where
f∗(ξ) = sup
x
[〈x, ξ〉 − f(x)] = − inf
x
[f(x) − 〈x, ξ〉]. (1)
2.2 Problem Formulation
Each player j chooses aj ∈ Aj to optimize the worst loss performance functional
Em˜lj(a, ω) subject to the constraint that the divergence Df(m˜ ‖ m) ≤ ρ. This
means that the worst loss performance is obtained under the assumption that
a virtual player (nature) acts as a discriminator/attacker who modifies the dis-
tribution m into m˜ with an effort capacity that should not exceed ρ > 0. The
robust stochastic optimization of player j given (aj′)j′ 6=j ,m, ρ is given by
(Pj)
{
infaj∈Aj supm˜∈Bρ(m) Em˜lj(a, ω). (2)
Throughout the paper we assume that the following hold: The measure m˜
is continuous with the respect to m and it is not a given profile, it could be
deformed or falsified by the discriminator. The function lj(., ω) is proper and
upper semi-continuous for m−almost all ω ∈ Ω. Either the domain Aj is a
non-empty compact set or Em˜lj(a, ω) is coercive.
Definition 1 (Distributionally Robust Game). The robust game G(m) involves
• the set of players J = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2
• the decision space Aj of each player j, j ∈ J
• the uncertainty set Bρ(m) defined on the set of probability distributions m
on Ω and ρ > 0
• the payoff function Em˜lj(a, ω) of player j, j ∈ J .
With the above game in mind, we can introduce the following solution con-
cept.
Definition 2 (Distributionally Robust Equilibrium). Let a∗j be the configuration
of player j and a∗−j := (a
∗
k)k 6=j . A strategy profile a
∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) satisfying
sup
m˜∈Bρ(m)
Em˜lj(a
∗, ω) ≤ sup
m˜∈Bρ(m)
Em˜lj(aj , a
∗
−j, ω),
for every aj ∈ Aj and every agent j, is said distributionally robust pure Nash
equilibrium of game G(m).
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2.3 From Duality to Triality Theory
We here streamline the basic idea of triality theory. To this purpose, consider
uncoupled domains Aj , j ∈ J . For a general function l2, one has
sup
a2∈A2
inf
a1∈A1
l2(a1, a2) ≤ inf
a1∈A1
sup
a2∈A2
l2(a1, a2)
and the difference
min
a1∈A1
max
a2∈A2
l2(a1, a2)− max
a2∈A2
min
a1∈A1
l2(a1, a2)
is the well-known duality gap. As it is widely known in duality theory from
Sion’s Theorem [11] (which is an extension of von Neumann minimax Theorem)
there is an equality, for example for convex-concave function, and the value is
achieved by a saddle point in the case of non-empty convex compact domain.
For a general function l3, (a1, a2, a3) 7→ l3(a1, a2, a3) one has
inf
a3∈A3
sup
a2∈A2
inf
a1∈A1
l3(.) ≤ inf
a1∈A1,a3∈A3
sup
a2∈A2
l3(.),
sup
a3∈A3
inf
a2∈A2
sup
a1∈A1
l3(.) ≥ sup
a1∈A1,a3∈A3
inf
a2∈A2
l3(.).
Proposition 1 (Triality). Let (a1, a2, a3) 7→ l3(a1, a2, a3) ∈ R be a function l3
defined on
∏3
i=1Ai. Then, the following inequalities hold:
supa2∈A2 infa1∈A1,a3∈A3 l3(a1, a2, a3) ≤
infa3∈A3 supa2∈A2 infa1∈A1 l3(a1, a2, a3) ≤
infa1∈A1,a3∈A3 supa2∈A2 l3(a1, a2, a3),
(3)
and similarly
supa1∈A1,a3∈A3 infa2∈A2 l3(a1, a2, a3) ≤
supa3∈A3 infa2∈A2 supa1∈A1 l3(a1, a2, a3) ≤
infa2∈A2 supa1∈A1,a3∈A3 l3(a1, a2, a3).
(4)
Proof. First we shall prove the sup inf inequality. Define
g(a2, a3) = inf
a1∈A1
l3(a1, a2, a3).
Thus, for all a2, a3, one has g(a2, a3) ≤ l3(a1, a2, a3). It follows that, for any
a1, a3,
sup
a2∈A2
g(a2, a3) ≤ sup
a2∈A2
l3(a1, a2, a3).
Using the definition of g, one obtain
sup
a2∈A2
inf
a1∈A1
l3(a1, a2, a3) ≤ sup
a2∈A2
l3(a1, a2, a3), ∀a1, a3.
Taking the infinimum in a1 yields:
sup
a2∈A2
inf
a1∈A1
l3(a1, a2, a3) ≤ inf
a1∈A1
sup
a2∈A2
l3(a1, a2, a3), ∀a3 (5)
Now, for variable in a3 we use two operations:
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• Taking the infininum in inequality (5) in a3 yields
inf
a3∈A3
sup
a2∈A2
inf
a1∈A1
l3(a1, a2, a3) ≤
inf
a3∈A3
inf
a1∈A1
sup
a2∈A2
l3(a1, a2, a3)
= inf
(a1,a3)∈A1×A3
sup
a2∈A2
l3(a1, a2, a3),
which proves the second part of the inequalities (3). The first part of the
inequalities (3) follows immediately from (5).
• Taking the supremum in inequality (5) in a3 yields
sup
(a2,a3)∈A2×A3
inf
a1∈A1
l3(a1, a2, a3)
≤ sup
a3∈A3
inf
a1∈A1
sup
a2∈A2
l3(a1, a2, a3),
which proves the first part of the inequalities (4). The second part of the
inequalities (4) follows immediately from (5).
This completes the proof.
We use the above inequalities in the Lagrangean relaxation of the MaxMin
Robust Game.
2.4 MaxMin Robust Game: Infinite Dimension
Assume that a 7→ Em˜lj(a, ω) is continuous for m−almost all ω. Then, the func-
tional Fj : m˜ 7→ infaj Em˜lj(a, ω) is Gateaux differentiable with derivative
Fj,m(mˆ) = inf
aj∈A∗j (m)
Emˆlj(a, ω),
where A∗j (m) = argminaj Emlj(a, ω) is the best-response under m. This deriva-
tive in the space of square integrable measurable functions under m which is
of infinite dimensions, does not facilitate the computation of the robust op-
timal strategy a∗j , m˜
∗. Below we propose an equivalent problem that reduces
considerably the curse of dimensionality of the problem.
2.5 MaxMin Robust Game: Dimension Reduction
In order to reduce the curse of dimensionality of the problem we use a triality
theory. The robust best-response problem of agent j is equivalent to
{
infaj supL∈Lρ(m) Em[ljL]; (6)
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where L(ω) = dm˜
dm
(ω) is the likelihood and set Lρ(m) is
Lρ(m) = {L |
∫
ω
f(L(ω))dm− f(1) ≤ ρ,
∫
ω
L(ω)dm = 1}.
We introduce the Lagrangian as
l˜j(a, L, λ, µ) =
∫
ω
lj(a, ω)L(ω)dm
+λ(ρ+ f(1)− ∫
ω
f(L(ω))dm)
+µ(1− ∫
ω
L(ω)dm(ω)),
where λ ≥ 0 and µ ∈ R. The problem solved by Player j is
(P˜ ∗j )
{
infaj supL∈Lρ(m) infλ≥0,µ∈R l˜j(a, L, λ, µ). (7)
A full understanding of problem (P˜ ∗j ) requires a triality theory (not a duality
theory) whose main principles were streamlined in Section 2.3. The underlying
idea is that one can use a transformation of the last two terms to derive a
finite dimensional optimization problem. The Lagrangian l˜j of agent j is clearly
concave in L and convex in λ, µ and is semi-continuous jointly. By the triality
theory above, l˜j : (a, L, λ, µ) 7→ l˜j(a, L, λ, µ) satisfies the sup inf inequality and
one has the following:
inf
aj
sup
L∈Lρ(m)
inf
λ≥0,µ∈R
l˜j(.) ≤ inf
aj
inf
λ≥0,µ∈R
sup
L∈Lρ(m)
l˜j(.).
In this case there is no gap in the second part of the optimization and the
following equality holds:
inf
aj
sup
L∈Lρ(m)
inf
λ≥0,µ∈R
l˜j(.) = inf
aj
inf
λ≥0,µ∈R
sup
L∈Lρ(m)
l˜j(.).
The latter problem can be rewritten as
(P˜ ∗j )
{
infaj∈Aj ,λ≥0,µ∈R[supL∈Lρ(m) l˜j(a, L, λ, µ)]. (8)
The Lagrangian function takes the form as l˜j = λ(ρ+ f(1))+µ+
∫ {L[lj−µ]−
λf(L)}dm. It follows that
sup
L∈Lρ(m)
l˜j(a, L, λ, µ) =
λ(ρ+ f(1)) + µ+ sup
L
∫
{L[lj − µ]− λf(L)}dm. (9)
Introducing the Fenchel-Legendre transform on L and exchanging sup and
∫
,
one gets
sup
L∈Lρ(m)
l˜j(.) = λ(ρ+ f(1)) + µ+
∫
λf∗(
lj − µ
λ
)dm.
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Since Aj × R+ × R is a subset of a finite dimensional vector space, then it
follows that the robust best-response problem of agent j is equivalent to the
finite dimensional stochastic optimization problem:
(P ∗j )


infaj∈Aj ,λ≥0,µ∈R l
∗
j (a, λ, µ,m)
l∗j (a, λ, µ,m) =
λ(ρ+ f(1)) + µ+
∫
λf∗( lj−µ
λ
)dm
= Emhj .
(10)
where hj is the integrand cost λ(ρ+ f(1)) + µ+ λf
∗( lj−µ
λ
). We have converted
the infinite dimensional problem (Pj) into a finite dimensional problem (P
∗
j ).
The above calculations culminate in the following result:
Proposition 2. If a, λ∗(a), µ∗(a), is a solution of (P ∗j ) then the optimal like-
lihood L∗ is such that
∫
ω
L∗dm = 1, f ′(L∗) = lj−µ
∗
λ∗
. This means that aj and
dm˜∗ = L∗dm provide a solution of the original problem (Pj).
Proof. Let λ∗(a), µ∗(a) be solution to (P ∗j ) associated with the profile a. Then,
the optimal likelihood L∗ is obtained by differentiating f∗ or by inverting the
equation f ′(L∗) = lj−µ
∗
λ∗
. As m˜ is a probability measure, and using the definition
of L∗, one gets
dm˜∗(ω) = L∗dm(ω).
It follows that a∗j , L
∗ solves the original problem (Pj).
Next we look at the existence of robust equilibria.
2.5.1 Existence of distributionally robust equilibria
As in classical game theory, sufficiency condition for existence of robust equi-
librium can be obtained from the standard fixed-point theory which we recall
next. Let Aj be nonempty compact convex sets and l∗j be continuous functions
such that for any fixed (zk)k 6=j , the function zj 7→ l∗j (z,m) is quasi-convex for
each j. Then, there exists at least one distributionally robust pure equilibrium.
This result can be easily extended to the coupled-action constraint case for
robust generalized Nash equilibria.
2.5.2 Performance Evaluation
Using
l∗j (a, λ, µ,m) = λ(ρ+ f(1)) + µ
+ limNj→+∞
1
Nj
∑Nj
k=1 λf
∗( lj(.,ωk)−µ
λ
)
where ωk ∼ m. Let
mNj =
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
δωk
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be the empirical measure of the channel state and define
ǫNj
√
Nj =
√
Nj sup
m˜∈DρNj (mNj )
Em˜lj −
√
NjEmNj lj −
√
NjρNjvarmNj [lj ]
with NjρNj < +∞. Then, the following holds: ǫNj
√
Nj → 0 as Nj grows. The
above result states that the robust performance captures the risk by considering
the variance and not just the ergodic performance.
3 Bregman Learning Algorithms
In this section we develop learning algorithms for (P ∗j )j .
3.1 Maximum Principle Features
Consider the optimal control problem infu∈U
∫ T
0 lˆ(t, z, u)dt such that z˙ = u. The
maximum principle is a necessary condition of optimality when the underlying
function is sufficiently smooth. The adjoint variable p˙ = −Hz = −lˆz and
the optimal control optimizes the Hamiltonian H(z, p) = infu∈U{lˆ + pu} i.e.,
the Legendre-Fenchel transform of −lˆ applied at the point −p. A closed-form
expression of the optimal control can be obtained and it is generically given by
u∗ = Hp(z, p). A necessary condition for optimality says that Hu∗(u − u∗) ≥ 0
for any u ∈ U, where Hu denotes an element of the sub-differential of H. This
latter variational equation can be rewritten as
0 ≤ Hu∗(u − u∗) = [lˆu∗ + p](u− u∗), (11)
for all u ∈ U.
In particular, an interior solution u∗ should solve p = −lˆu∗ and the adjoint
equation becomes p˙ = d
dt
(−lˆu∗) = −lˆz(z, u∗), which means that
d
dt
lˆz˙ = lˆz(z, z˙).
The latter equation is also called Euler-Lagrange equation in the field of calculus
of variations. Since the minimization is among all possible curves, this minimum
principle may exhibit features that allow to investigate faster time curves.
3.2 Bregman Speedup Learning
Let g : A → R be a differentiable, strictly convex function. The Bregman
divergence [10] is dg : A× relint(A)→ R and is defined as
dBRg (y, x) = g(y)− g(x)− 〈gx(x), y − x〉,
where relint(A) denotes the relative interior of A.
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We investigate the equation d
dt
lˆu(z, u) = lˆz(z, u) for a class of quantity-of-
interest lˆ. Let the family of Bregman-based Lagrangian be lˆ(z, u) = eα+γ [dg(z+
e−αu, z)− eβl∗(z)].
Proposition 3. The Euler-Lagrange equation reduces to the following second
order differential system, for γ˙ = eα,
z¨ + (eα − α˙)z˙ + e2α+βg−1zz (z + e−αx˙)l∗z(z) = 0. (12)
Proof. We start with the definition of Bregman divergence. A simple computa-
tion shows that
∂ydg(y, x) = gx(y)− gx(x), ∂xdg(y, x) = −gxx(x).(y − x).
By differentiating the functional lˆ one gets
lˆz = e
α+γ [−dg,1(z + e−αu, z)− dg,2(z + e−αu, z) + eβl∗z ]
= eα+γ [−gz(y) + gz(z) + gzz(z)(y − z) + eβl∗z ],
lˆu = −eγdg,1(z + e−αu, z) = −eγ [gz(z + e−αu)− gz(z)]
(13)
It follows that
d
dt
lˆu = −γ˙eγ [gz(z + e−αu)− gz(z)]
−eγ d
dt
[gz(z + e
−αu)− gz(z)]
= −γ˙eγ [gz(z + e−αu)− gz(z)]
−eγ [gzz(z + e−αu)(z˙ − α˙e−αz˙ + e−αz¨)− gzz(z)z˙]
= lˆz
= eα+γ [−gz(y) + gz(z) + gzz(z)(y − z) + eβl∗z ].
(14)
Thus,
−γ˙[gz(z + e−αz˙)− gz(z)]
−[gzz(z + e−αz˙)(z˙ − α˙e−αz˙ + e−αz¨)− gzz(z)z˙]
= eα[−gz(z + e−αz˙) + gz(z) + gzz(z)e−αz˙ + eβl∗z ].
(15)
By rearranging the terms in z¨, z˙ we obtain
eα(γ˙ − eα)g−1zz (z + e−αz˙)[gz(z + e−αz˙)− gz(z)]
+eαg−1zz (z + e
−αz˙)[gzz(z + e−αz˙)(z˙ − α˙e−αz˙)− gzz(z)z˙]
+e2αg−1zz (z + e
−αz˙)[gzze−αz˙ + eβl∗z ] + z¨ = 0.
(16)
Taking γ˙ = eα yields
eαg−1zz (z + e
−αz˙)[gzz(z + e−αz˙)(z˙ − α˙e−αz˙)]
+e2αg−1zz (z + e
−αz˙)[gzze−αz˙ + eβl∗z ] + z¨ = 0.
(17)
The Euler-Lagrange equation reduces to
z¨ + (eα − α˙)z˙ + e2α+βg−1zz (z + e−αz˙)l∗z(z) = 0, (18)
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which can be rewritten as
[z¨e−α + (1− a˙e−α)z˙]gzz(z + e−αz˙) + eα+βl∗z(z) = 0. (19)
From the above, the Bregman algorithm yields
d
dt
[gz(z + e
−αz˙)] = −eα+βl∗z(z). (20)
This completes the proof.
Note that the second order system is easily converted into a first-order system
by setting 

y = z + e−αu,
z˙ = u,
u˙ = z¨ = −(eα − α˙)u − e2α+βg−1zz (z + e−αu)l∗z(z).
Definition 3. We say that z 7→ l˜∗(z) is a best response pseudo-potential func-
tion for the distributionally robust game G(m) if
argmin
zj
l˜∗(z) ⊆ argmin
zj
l∗j (z), for every j.
The Bregman algorithm is given by
d
dt
[gz(z + e
−αz˙)] = −eα+β l˜∗z(z), z(0) = z0, (21)
where β(t) = β(0) +
∫ t
0
eα(t
′) dt′, β(0) ≥ 0, and α is a time-dependent function.
Proposition 4. If l˜∗ is convex then
0 ≤ −l˜(z∗) + l˜(z(t)) ≤ e−β(t)c0,
where
c0 = d
BR
g (z
∗, z0 + e−α(0)z˙0) + eβ(0)[−l˜(z∗) + l˜(z(0))].
By choosing α(t) = t, β(t) = et, and the error gap is
−l˜(z∗) + l˜(z(t)) ≤ e−etc0.
It takes Tη = log log(
c0
η
) time units to reach a neighborhood of the equilibrium
payoff of z∗ with a precision η > 0. This is faster than Ishikawa-Nesterov algo-
rithm O( 1√
η
), gradient ascent method O( 1
η
), no-regret dynamics, and back-box
optimization c0
η2
. Thus, Bregman dynamics speeds up the learning and improves
classical methods with exponential decay.
The proof of Proposition 4 is based on a careful construction of a generalized
best-response pseudo-potential function using Pontryagin maximum principle.
It extends the framework developed in [4] to the context of strategic-form games.
Then we check that the following function V is a Lyapuvov function:
V (z∗, z(t)) = dBRg (z
∗, z(t) + e−α(t)z˙(t)) + eβ(t)[−l˜(z∗) + l˜(z(t))]
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where z(t) is generated by the Bregman algorithm.
Note that Proposition 4 does not require the strong convexity property often
used in the proof of convergence gradient dynamics and Newton-based gradient
methods. This is because the Bregman divergence is carefully designed to com-
pensate that part. Table 1 summarizes the theoretical speedup advantages of
Bregman algorithms over the state-of-the-art algorithms.
Accuracy Time to Reach
This paper O(e−β(t)) O(β−1(log( 1
η
)))
This paper (Bregman) O(e−e
t
) O(log(log( 1
η
)))
Ishikawa-Nesterov O( 1
t2
) O( 1√
η
)
Conjugate/proximal gradient O(1
t
) O( 1
η
)
Gradient ascent O(1
t
) O( 1
η
)
Regret-min O( log t
t
) -
Standard black-box O( 1√
t
+ .) O( 1
η2
)
Table 1: Performance of the proposed Bregman algorithm compared to the
classical ones with a precision error within η > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us define function V as follows.
V (z, u, t, z∗) = dg(z∗, z + e−αu) + eβ[−l∗(z∗) + l∗(z)]. (22)
Then the function V (z, u, t) is positive. Let us compute the time derivative of
V over the path z(t), u(t) generated by the Bregman algorithm.
d
dt
[gz(z + e
−αz˙)] = −eα+βl∗z(z).
We also have that
d
dt
V (z(t), u(t), t, z∗) =
− d
dt
[z + e−αu]gzz(z + e−αu).(z∗ − z − e−αu)
+β˙eβ[l∗(z)− l∗(z∗)] + eβl∗z(z)z˙
(23)
By summing and subtracting the same term we have
d
dt
V (z(t), u(t), t, z∗) =
− d
dt
[z + e−αu]gzz(z + e−αu).(z∗ − z − e−αu)
+β˙eβ [l∗(z)− l∗(z∗) + l∗z(z∗ − z)− l∗z(z∗ − z)]
+eβl∗z(z)z˙ = − ddt [gz(z + e−αu)].(z∗ − z − e−αu)
+β˙eβ [l∗(z)− l∗(z∗) + l∗z(z∗ − z)]
−β˙eβl∗z(z∗ − z) + eβl∗z(z)z˙.
(24)
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The above leads to further expansion as follows
d
dt
V (z(t), u(t), t, z∗) = eα+βl∗z(z)(z
∗ − z − e−αu)+
β˙eβ[l∗(z)− l∗(z∗) + l∗z(z∗ − z)]
−β˙eβl∗z(z∗ − z) + eβl∗z(z)z˙
= eα+βl∗z(z)(z
∗ − z) + eβl∗z(z)(z˙ − u)
−β˙eβl∗z(z∗ − z) + β˙eβ[l∗(z)− l∗(z∗)− l∗z(z − z∗)]
= eβ(eα − β˙)l∗z(z∗ − z)
+β˙eβ [l∗(z)− l∗(z∗)− l∗z(z − z∗)].
(25)
By convexity of the function l∗, [l∗(z)−l∗(z∗)−l∗z(z−z∗)] ≤ 0 and l∗z(z∗−z) ≤ 0.
If eα − β˙ ≥ 0 then
d
dt
V (z(t), u(t), t, z∗) = eβ(eα − β˙)l∗z(z∗ − z)
+β˙eβ[l∗(z)− l∗(z∗)− l∗z(z − z∗)] ≤ 0.
(26)
Thus, d
dt
V (z(t), u(t), t, z∗) ≤ 0 for β˙ ≤ eα. Then the function is decreasing
over the path of the Bregman algorithm. It follows that eβ [l∗(z) − l∗(z∗)] ≤
V (z, u, t, z∗) ≤ V (z0, u0, t0). Then, the global error is
0 ≤ l∗(z)− l∗(z∗) ≤ e−βV (z0, u0, t0),
with β˙ ≤ eα, which shows an exponential convergence to z∗. This completes the
proof.
4 Stochastic Bregman Learning
Very often the computation of the terms ∇El∗, E[λ(ρ + f(1)) + µ+ f∗( lj−µ
λ
)]
or its partial derivatives is challenging and depends on the structure of the
distribution m. We now propose a swarm learning to estimate the expected
gradient and then insert it to the Bregman algorithm (21), leading to particle
swarm stochastic Bregman algorithm.
4.1 Single particle
We propose a stochastic Bregman learning framework which is adjusted based
only on the realized integrand hj(z, ωj) := λ(ρ + f(1)) + µ + λf
∗( lj−µ
λ
). The
expected value of hj is Eω∼mhj = l∗j . The stochastic Bregman dynamics yields
d
dt
[gj,zj (z + e
−αu)] = −eα+βhj,zj (z, ωj)
= −eα+β[Ehj,zj (z, ωj) +Wj ] = −eα+β[l∗j,z(z) +Wj(z, ωj)],
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Function z = (a, λ, µ) is now a stochastic process because of the stochastic term
ωj and Wj(z) = hj,zj (z, ωj) − Ehj,zj (z, ωj). The variance of W is being high
and not vanishing because it is based on a single particle path discrepancy. We
introduce in the following subsection a swarm of particles.
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4.2 Swarm of particles
Let us associate to each agent j a swarm of virtual particles ωjk. Then, we have
Ehj,zj (z, .) = lim
N
1
N
N∑
k=1
hj,zj (z, ωjk).
Swarm-based stochastic Bregman dynamics yields
d
dt
[gzj(z + e
−αu)] = −eα+β 1
N
∑N
k=1 hj,zj(z, ωjk),
ωjk ∼ m, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. (27)
This is a mean-field-type interacting system and can be seen as control-dependent
correlated noise modification of the Bregman dynamics as
d
dt
[gzj (z + e
−αu)] = −eα+β[l∗j,zj (z) + ǫj,N (z, ω)],
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
where ǫj,N =
1
N
∑N
k=1 hj,zj (z, ωjk) − l∗j,zj(z) has zero mean and standard devi-
ation as √
E[ǫ2j,N ] =
√
var[hj,zj(z, .)]
N2
.
For a realized ω, set
l∗j,N =
1
N
N∑
k=1
hj(z, ωjk), z
∗
j,N ∈ argmin
z
1
N
N∑
k=1
hj(z, ωjk).
Then, the particle swarm Bregman algorithm (27) gives as output the function
zN(t) that satisfies
0 ≤ −l˜N (z∗N ) + l˜N (zN (t)) ≤ e−β(t)c0,N
where c0,N := d
BR
g (z
∗
N , z0 + e
−α(0)z˙0) + eβ(0)[−l˜N(z∗N ) + l˜N (z0)].
This says that the N−swarm per player Bregman scheme provides a good
approximation of the robust equilibrium.
5 Numerical Investigation
To illustrate the particle swarm Bregman algorithm (27) we consider specific
robust games. We consider two agents and the discriminator/adversary. We
choose
f(x) =
{
x log x− x if x > 0,
0 if x = 0.
(28)
We compute f(1) = −1 and f ′(x) = log x, f ′′(x) = 1
x
> 0. Hence f is convex
on R+. The Legendre-Fenchel transform of f yields
f∗(ξ) = eξ.
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5.1 Best-response Pseudo-Potential Distributionally Ro-
bust Game
We set
lj(a, ω) = log
(
1 + ω21a
2
1 + ω
2
2a
2
2
)
defined over R2. The integrand function hj is
hj = λ(ρ − 1) + µ+ λ(1 + ω21a21 + ω22a22)
1
λ e−
µ
λ
The random variable ω is distributed over m and we assume that ω has finite
moments. The stochastic robust objective function l∗j,N :
l∗j,N = λ(ρ− 1) + µ+
λ
N
N∑
k=1
(1 + ω21ka
2
1 + ω
2
2ka
2
2)
1
λ e−
µ
λ
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Figure 1: Gradient vs Bregman-based dynamics.
We illustrate the Bregman-based dynamics in Figure 1 N = 1000 samples.
We observe a rapid convergence to the robust equilibrium. The trajectory is not
a descent but the amplitude of oscillation quickly decreases and an acceptable
convergence time that is 20 times better than the classical gradient dynamics.
5.2 Non-Convex Setting
We set
lj(a, ω) = log
(
20 + ω2 − sin(a1) sin(a2)√a1a2
)
,
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over the action space [0, 10]2. The function lj has multiple local extrema as illus-
trated in Figures 2 and 3. The objective function of agent j is non-convex and
non-concave. The function lj is chosen because it does not fulfill the conditions
of the Theorem 4. We observed that the Bregman algorithm behaves well even
for this multimodal case which opens the investigation for non-convex objective
functions. The multimodal function has a robust equilibrium around (7.9, 7.9)
and the equilibrium performance is around 7.88. In Figure 4, the Bregman learn-
ing outcome changes from the distributionally robust Nash equilibrium (7.9, 7.9)
to a local maximum (7.9, 5.1).
Figure 2: The function lj is non-convex, non-concave and has multiple local
extrema.
6 Finite action spaces case
We now discuss how the above framework can be used in the discrete action
space case. We limit our exposition to the finite set. Aj is a finite (with
two or more actions), it is not a convex set. We convexify them as standard
mixed strategy approach. Aj will be replaced by Xj the simplex over Aj . The
robust payoff on pure action profile will be replaced by the expected robust
payoff. One obtains the so-called mixed extension of the game. The existence
of distributionally robust mixed equilibrium follows from standard fixed-point
theorems.
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Figure 3: The particle swarm Bregman learning leads to the robust Nash
equilibria around (7.9, 7.9) and the equilibrium value is around 7.88.
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7 Conclusion
We have introduced distributionally robust game with continuous action space
for each agent and a possible adversarial modification of the uncertainty. The
problem is formulated using a notion of divergence between two measures: the
modified measure and the exact measure associated to the uncertainty. In the
context of existence of robust solutions, additional difficulties arise if in addition
a robustness condition or an adversarial control of the distribution is involved
in the objective function. We have used triality theory to transform the ob-
jective function of each agent. This transformation reduces considerably the
curse of dimensionality of the problem. Then, sufficient conditions of existence
of solution are derived. We constructed a speedup learning algorithm based
on Bregman discrepancy. The methodology does not require strong convexity
assumptions as in the classical gradient algorithms. The convergence time is
shown to be much faster than the current state-of-the-art algorithms developed
for pseudo-potential games. Our future work aims to use and apply the approach
to adversarial generative networks.
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